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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY

CRIMINAL

LAW-SUFFICIENCY

OF INDICTMENT

Defendant was charged with concealing moonshine, and contended
that the amended information' failed to charge the commission of a crime.

Held, the amended information was sufficient. State v. Ellis, 78 So.2d 729
(Fla. 1955).
In an effort to overcome the possibility of imposing a severe penalty
for a minor wrong, courts have resorted to various methods of giving
relief to defendants. One device effectively used was to insist on particularity
of form and substance required of an information.2 Since legislatures have
made punishment approximate, in severity, the degree of the crime, the
courts have lessened the requirement of strict compliance to form. Modern
courts have almost completely done away with subterfuges and evasions,
and employ a forthright common-sense approach to questions of form s and
substance 4 of information.

In the case of Brown v. State," the information charged the accused
with concealing a beverage "whereof a tax is imposed." The motion was
quashed because it failed to state a criminal offense. The rationale is
that there can be no imposition of state taxes on an illegally-manufactured
product. Such was the feeling of the court up to and including the case of
State v. Pridgen;6 but the court did much to aid the prosecution in future
cases by indicating the wording required for a sufficient information.7
Armed with this dicta, the state in the case of State v. Harris8 conformed
to the opinion in the Brown case and the conviction was npheld.
The courts rely on the hypothetical "reasonable man," in almost
every field of law," and informations are now receiving a more reasonable
interpretation. Misspelled names, omission of formal matter, verbiage
and surplusage are no longer fatal to an information.' 0 The substance appears
1. The amended iinfornation charged that Ellis, "did conceal and was concerned
in concealing a beverage for or in respect whereof a tax is imposed by the beverage
law or would be imposed ifsuch beverage were manufactured in or brought into the
State in accordance with the regulatory provisions thereof with intent to defraud the
State of Florida of such tax, namely two gallons of intoxicating liquor commonly called
Moonshine whiskey ....
2. People v. Cohen, 303 Ii. 523, 135 N.E. 731 (1922)
...
Criminal law
is fast outgroxving these technicalities which grew up when the punishment for crime
was inhuman and it was necessary for courts to resort to technicalities to prevent
injustice.").
3.Lewis v.State, 55 Fla. 54, 45 So. 998 (1908) ("It is the policy of the court
as it evidently was of the legislature . . . to uphold . . .informations whenever there
has been a substantial compliance with the law therein.")
4. Brunson v. State, 70 Fla. 387, 70 So. 390 (1915).
;. 152 Fla. 853, 13 So.2d 458 (1943).
6. 155 Fla 31, 19 So.2d 510 (1944).
7."If the information had alleged that itwas a beverage in respect whereof a
tax 'would be imposed if such beverage were manufactured ...
in accordance with
the regulatory provisions of the Beverage Act,'.
8. 160 Fla. 720, 36 So.2d 372 (1948).
9. See PROSSER ON ToRTS 225 The Reasonable Man; (The courts have dealt with
this problem (i.e., conduct required by the community) by creating a fictitious person
. ..the reasonable man of ordinary priudence).
10. Pickerson v. State, 94 Fla. 268, 13 So. 707 (1927); Shumake v. State,
90 Fla. 133, 105 So. 314 (1925); Morris v.State, 279 S.W, 273 (Tex. 1926); Ross
v.State, 277 S.W. 667 (Tex. 1925).

CASENOTES
to dominate, as was aptly stated by Mr. William Riewick Riddell, Justice
of Appeal, Ontario, "There used to be technical objections . . .but these
are practically obsolete. The accused may ask particulars of place, time,
manner, etc., and these if proper will be ordekd furnished, though probably there never was an accused who did not know perfectly well what he
was charged with.""
It follows then, that the use of descriptive words such as are commonly
used by the community are capable of informing an accused of the charges
against him, and therefore are sufficient informations. 12 Merely because
a word or phrase is beyond precise definition does not mean that its use
and interpretation are beyond the comprehension of the reasonable man.
By requiring precisely definable words, the ends of justice are often submerged in formalism.'
For example, the defendant in the instant case
was accused of manufacturing "moonshine".
If he were accused of
processing an aqueous solution of CHOI-I (ethyl alcohol) containing
C,H,OH (propyl alcohol, 2 C
I-LOH (Isolutyl alcohol) or CH,,OH
(Amyl alcohol), 4 he may indeed be in the dark concerning the charges
against him. The courts are not losing sight of the fact that the information must charge the necessary elements of the offense. 15 The purpose
of requiring exactness in the information is to clearly insert in the record
and inform the defendant of the precise charges against him."' So, in
the present case, "where their (referring to descriptive words) meaning is
familiar to anyone of general intelligence as designating liquor illicitly
distilled for beverage purposes", the information was held to be sufficient."
The principal case firmly establishes Florida as one of the many
states which are removing the anachronistic impediments to justice. The
Harris case 8 which appeared to overrule the earlier rulings was strengthened
by the present case. How far the liberal interpretation of descriptive
words is to be carried is yet to be determined. The trend is in the direction
of a more liberal interpretation of the wording of informations, without
impairing the rights of defendants.
FRANK J. GREFE
II. The Panel, Vol. 10, n. 4 (1932).
12. American Law Institute in its CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OFFICIAL DRAFT
1930, § 173, has adopted the reasonable construction of words . . . an information
is sufficient to describe "by any term which in common understanding embraces such ..
thing and does not include . . . any thing which is not by law the subject of or
connected with the offense."
13. 37 MIcH. L.J. (1939).
14. Chemical content of wood alcohol. Some brands of "moonshine" contain
wood alcohol,
15. Dowling v. State, 98 Fla. 523, 124 So. 12 (1929); Streeter v. State, 89 Fla.
400, 104 So. 858 (1925); Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91, 955 So. 115 (1923); Randall
v.State, 82 Fla. 333, 89 So. 875 (1921).
16. Jari v. U.S., 19 F.2d 891 (8th Cir, 1927); ltorn v. U.S., 182 Fed. 721 (8th
C ir. 1910)
*
17. State v. Griffith, 311 Miss. 630, 279 S.W. 135 (1925): State v. Vamon,
187 Miss. 510, 174 S.W.2d 146 (1943).
18. Harris v St.ate, 160 Fla. 720, 36 So.2d 372 (1948).

